《英美法案例精選叢書:美國侵權(quán)法(第2版)(英文版)》所選取的案例比較系統(tǒng)地反映了英美侵權(quán)法(主要是美國)的主要制度。為了便于讀者能夠在較短的時(shí)間內(nèi)獲得英美侵權(quán)法最為基礎(chǔ)的知識(shí),編者特 意在每一章或每一節(jié)的開頭部分對(duì)該章節(jié)所涉及的法律原理用中文進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要的表述;此外,又在每個(gè)英文案例之后附上思考題,使讀者可以帶著問題閱讀案例,加 深對(duì)案例中闡明的法律原理的理解。筆者希望,讀者能夠在閱讀這些案例的過程中,不僅弄懂每一個(gè)案例的事實(shí)、判決結(jié)果和法官的推理過程,而且能透過這些案例 了解英美國家的法律制度,以及它們所體現(xiàn)的社會(huì)價(jià)值觀念和公共政策。
近年來,隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化進(jìn)程的加快和我國對(duì)外貿(mào)易總量的大幅攀升,我國與外國主體間的貿(mào)易摩擦和經(jīng)濟(jì)糾紛呈現(xiàn)不斷上升的態(tài)勢(shì),與此同時(shí),隨著我國大國地位的日益顯現(xiàn),在有關(guān)國際組織的法律崗位上,我國應(yīng)當(dāng)有數(shù)量更多、職位更高的代言人。凡此種種,都對(duì)培養(yǎng)能夠服務(wù)于我國利益的高端國際化法律人才提出急迫的需求;與此同時(shí),也會(huì)引發(fā)這樣的問題:我國的大學(xué)在培養(yǎng)此類人才方面應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)揮什么作用?
毋庸置疑的是,能夠服務(wù)于我國利益的高端國際化法律人才必須是學(xué)貫東西的人才,必須具有我國國內(nèi)法律教育的背景,懂得中國國情和精通中國的法律。因此,作為他們成才的第一步,必須在中國的法律院校接受教育。這就決定了,我國的法學(xué)院在培養(yǎng)此類人才方面是可以有所作為的。
接下來的問題是,中國的法律院校應(yīng)如何在學(xué)生接受國內(nèi)教育的階段,特別是在大學(xué)本科階段,為他們后來成為高端國際化法律人才,在知識(shí)儲(chǔ)備和能力培養(yǎng)方面奠定良好的基礎(chǔ)?實(shí)踐證明,高端國際化法律人才在其接受教育的過程中,必須在基礎(chǔ)英語、法律專業(yè)英語、中國法知識(shí)、外國法知識(shí),以及交叉學(xué)科知識(shí)等多個(gè)方面積累知識(shí)和擴(kuò)展能力。由此為今后的出國深造,特別是在特定的專業(yè)法律領(lǐng)域的成功發(fā)展,奠定堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。
因此,對(duì)法律專業(yè)英語的學(xué)習(xí)是培養(yǎng)高端國際化法律人才的重要環(huán)節(jié)。進(jìn)一步說,隨著近年來我國法律事務(wù)中涉外內(nèi)容的增加,即使對(duì)一般的法律工作人員來說,要?jiǎng)偃稳粘5墓ぷ,通常也需要在相?dāng)?shù)某潭壬暇邆浞蓪I(yè)英語的能力。
本系列教材是很好的適合于在我國法律院校開展法律專業(yè)英語教學(xué)的教材。首先,本系列教材是以英美法為內(nèi)容的教材。目前,英美法不僅在解決國際商事爭(zhēng)端的法律體系中明顯地占據(jù)著主導(dǎo)地位,并且WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的運(yùn)作模式也是以英美法為基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行設(shè)計(jì)的。其次,本系列教材是案例教材。采用這套教材,有助于推動(dòng)案例教學(xué)和法律教學(xué)改革的開展。最后,本系列教材自2007年出版以來,已經(jīng)為一些法律院校采用。實(shí)踐證明,這套教材的編寫和使用對(duì)于我國國際化法律人才的培養(yǎng)已經(jīng)起到了一定的作用。其效果之一是,由于這套教材中的案例大都是精選的為美國法學(xué)院的教材所采用的經(jīng)典案例,在國內(nèi)學(xué)習(xí)過此套教材的學(xué)生,借助原來學(xué)習(xí)的基礎(chǔ),在后來去英美法國家留學(xué)的過程中,往往能駕輕就熟,獲得較好的成績(jī)。
本系列教材第二版中的各個(gè)教材對(duì)第一版作了不同程度的改進(jìn)和完善,進(jìn)一步提高了質(zhì)量。在這一版付梓之際,我謹(jǐn)代表作者們對(duì)使用本教材的各位教師表示衷心的感謝,并希望在我國的法律院校中,有更多的教師加入我國國際化法律人才培養(yǎng)的教師行列。
第一章 故意侵權(quán)
第一節(jié) 威嚇和毆打
案例1 Vosburg v. Putney
案例2 Anicet v. Gant
第二節(jié) 不法拘禁
案例3 Parvi v. City of Kingston
第三節(jié) 故意精神傷害
案例4 Womack v. Eldridge
第二章 過失侵權(quán)
第一節(jié) 注意義務(wù)
案例5 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
案例6 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California
案例7 Farwell v. Keaton
案例8 Harper v. Herman
案例9 Korman v. Mallin
第二節(jié) 注意義務(wù)的違反
案例10 Brown v. Kendall
案例11 United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
案例12 McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc.
案例13 Stewart v. Martin Motts
案例14 Robinson v. Lindsay
案例15 Cervelli v. Graves
案例16Poyner v. Loftus
第三節(jié) 因果關(guān)系
案例17 Overseas Tankship (U. K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co., Ltd.
案例18 Frances A. McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances
Company
第四節(jié) 損害
案例19 Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc.
案例20 K.A.C.v.Benson
案例21 State Farm v. Campbell
第五節(jié) 舉證責(zé)任
案例22 Byrne v. Boadle
案例23 Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc.
第三章 嚴(yán)格責(zé)任
第一節(jié) 危險(xiǎn)理論的起源
案例24 Fletcher v. Rylands
案例25 Rylands v. Fletcher
第二節(jié) 直接暴力侵害
案例26 Sullivan v. Dunham
第三節(jié) 超常危險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)理論
案例27 Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.
第四章 產(chǎn)品責(zé)任
第一節(jié) 產(chǎn)品責(zé)任的嚴(yán)格責(zé)任之訴
案例28 Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
案例29 Soule v. General Motors Corp.
第二節(jié) 產(chǎn)品責(zé)任領(lǐng)域嚴(yán)格責(zé)任的適用范圍
案例30 Hoven v. Kelble
案例31 Brown v. Superior Court
第三節(jié) 產(chǎn)品責(zé)任的抗辯
案例32 Daly v. General Motors Corporation
案例33 Jones v. Ryobi, Ltd.
案例34 Smith v. Ontario Sewing Machine Co. Ltd.
第五章 私人妨害責(zé)任
案例35 Jost v. Dairyland Power Co.
案例36 Carpenter v. The Double R Cattle Company, Inc.
案例37 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co, Inc.
第六章 環(huán)境侵權(quán)責(zé)任
案例38 Exxon Shipping Company, et al., Petitioners, v.Grant Banker et al
案例39 United States of America, Plaintiff v. J.R.Nelson Vessel Ltd. et al, Defendants.
案例40 United States, Petitioner v. Bestfoods et al.
These two words have never been given an inclusive definition.What is a cause in a legal sense,still more what is a proximate cause,depend in each case upon many considerations,as does the existence of negligence itself.Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us.A boy throws as tone into a pond.The ripples spread the water level rises.The history of that pond is altered to all eternity.It will be altered by other causes also.Yet it will be forever the resultant of all causes combined.Each one will have an influence.How great only omniscience can say.You may speak of a chain,or if you please,a net.An analogy is of little aid.Each cause brings about future events.Without each the future would not be the same.Each is proximate in the sense it is essential.But that is not what we mean by the word.Nor on the other hand do we mean sole cause.There is no such thing.
Should analogy be thought helpful,however,I prefer that of a stream.The spring,starting on its journey,is joined by tributary after tributary.The river,reaching the ocean,comes from a hundred sources.No man may say whence any drop of water is derived.Yet for a time distinction may be possible.Into the clear creek,brown swamp water flows from the left Later,from the right comes water stained by its clay bed.The three may remain for a space,sharply divided.But at last,inevitably no trace of separation remains.They are so commingled that all distinction is lost
As we have said,we cannot trace the effect of an act to the end,if end there is.Again,however,we may trace it part of the way: A murder at Sarajevo may be the necessary antecedent to an assassination in London twenty years hence.An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago.We may follow the fire from the shed to the last building.We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused its destruction.
A cause,but not the proximate cause.What we do mean by the word "proximate" is,that because of convenience,of public policy,of a rough sense of justice,the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.This is not logic.It is practical politics.Take our rule as to fires.Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor's.I may recover from a negligent radioed.He may not.Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as the other.We may regret that the line was drawn just where it was,but drawn somewhere it had to be.We said the act of the radioed was not the proximate cause of our neighbor's fire.Cause it surely was.The words we used were simply indicative of our notions of public policy.Other courts think differently.But somewhere they reach the point where they cannot say the stream comes from any one source.
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