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　　《證券分析（原書第6版·雙語版）》被譽(yù)為投資者的圣經(jīng)，自1934年出版以來，80年暢銷不衰。市場反復(fù)證明，《證券分析》是價值投資的經(jīng)典之作�！蹲C券分析》第6版（雙語版）是1940年版本的升級版。而《證券分析》1940年版本是作者格雷厄姆和多德最滿意的版本，也是股神巴菲特最為鐘愛的版本。第6版在保持原書原貌的同時，增加了10位華爾街金融大家的導(dǎo)讀，既表明了這本書在華爾街投資大師心目中的重要地位，也為這部經(jīng)典著作增添了時代氣息。
　　《證券分析（原書第6版·雙語版）》的作者本杰明·格雷厄姆是價值投資理論的奠基人，被譽(yù)為“華爾街教父”。他既在美國哥倫比亞大學(xué)商學(xué)院任過教授，又在華爾街創(chuàng)造過輝煌的投資業(yè)績；既經(jīng)歷過讓投資者得意忘形的大牛市，又經(jīng)歷過讓投資者沮喪絕望的大蕭條。市場錘煉了格雷厄姆，也證明了價值投資的意義所在。
　　《證券分析（原書第6版·雙語版）》各章導(dǎo)讀源自由著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家巴曙松老師領(lǐng)銜專業(yè)翻譯團(tuán)隊(duì)，歷時一年半，精心打造的最專業(yè)、最權(quán)威的中文譯本。正如巴曙松老師所言：“歷史不會重演，然而總是押著韻腳。當(dāng)前中國證券市場的轉(zhuǎn)型，同樣需要確立價值投資的理念。我決定組織力量翻譯《證券分析》第6版的初衷，也正在于此�！�

　　《證券分析》第6版是巴菲特唯一親筆作序推薦圖書。本書在1940年經(jīng)典版本基礎(chǔ)上，增加華爾街10位金融大家全新導(dǎo)讀，使得經(jīng)典投資理念與當(dāng)今市場環(huán)境完美結(jié)合，讓證券分析在新的時代再次煥發(fā)出耀眼光彩。
　　本書作者格雷厄姆被譽(yù)為 “現(xiàn)代證券分析之父”“華爾街教父”，價值投資理論奠基人，其在投資界的地位，相當(dāng)于物理學(xué)界的愛因斯坦，生物學(xué)界的達(dá)爾文。其投資哲學(xué)為“股神”巴菲特、“市盈率鼻祖”約翰?內(nèi)夫、“指數(shù)基金教父”約翰?博格等一大批頂級投資大師所推崇，如今活躍在華爾街的數(shù)十位資產(chǎn)規(guī)模上億的投資管理人都自稱為他的信徒。
　　當(dāng)前中國資本市場正處于挑戰(zhàn)與機(jī)遇并存的轉(zhuǎn)型過程之中，無論是投資者、上市公司、證券公司等市場參與者，還是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)等，都在探索下一步市場發(fā)展的新趨勢。在這個時間點(diǎn)推出《證券分析》第6版（雙語版），是希望價值投資能夠成為主導(dǎo)性的投資理念，成為當(dāng)前市場轉(zhuǎn)型的重要組成部分之一。
　　本書中文部分選自巴曙松老師帶領(lǐng)的業(yè)內(nèi)專業(yè)人士翻譯團(tuán)隊(duì)，歷時一年半潛心打造的最專業(yè)、最權(quán)威的中文譯本。
　　在國內(nèi)，本書得到了上海證券交易所總經(jīng)理黃紅元，國泰基金管理公司總經(jīng)理金旭，興業(yè)銀行行長李仁杰鼎力推薦。在國外，耶魯首席投資官大衛(wèi)·斯文森，摩根大通主席兼首席執(zhí)行官杰米·戴蒙，捐獻(xiàn)基金領(lǐng)袖杰克·邁耶等數(shù)十位華爾街大鱷聯(lián)袂推薦。
　　湛廬文化出品。

　　本杰明·格雷厄姆，被譽(yù)為 “現(xiàn)代證券分析之父”“華爾街教父”，價值投資理論奠基人，其在投資界的地位，相當(dāng)于物理學(xué)界的愛因斯坦，生物學(xué)界的達(dá)爾文。
　　作為一代宗師，其投資哲學(xué)為“股神”巴菲特、“市盈率鼻祖”約翰·內(nèi)夫、“指數(shù)基金教父”約翰?博格等一大批頂級投資大師所推崇，如今活躍在華爾街的數(shù)十位資產(chǎn)規(guī)模上億的投資管理人都自稱為他的信徒。
　　他不僅是沃倫·巴菲特就讀哥倫比亞大學(xué)時的研究生導(dǎo)師，而且被巴菲特膜拜為 “精神導(dǎo)師”，巴菲特稱自己投資理論的“85%來自格雷厄姆”。巴菲特甚至給自己的兒子取名霍華德·格雷厄姆·巴菲特，以紀(jì)念恩師。

　　戴維·多德，哥倫比亞大學(xué)商學(xué)院副院長、教授，曾任美國金融協(xié)會副主席、美國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會會員、社會科學(xué)研究理事會成員。格雷厄姆的助手、追隨者和忠貞不渝的伙伴。

　　巴曙松，國務(wù)院發(fā)展研究中心金融研究所研究員、博士生導(dǎo)師、享受國務(wù)院特殊津貼專家。擔(dān)任中國銀行業(yè)協(xié)會首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、中國宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會副秘書長、商務(wù)部經(jīng)貿(mào)政策委員會委員、中國證監(jiān)會并購重組專家咨詢委員會委員、中國銀監(jiān)會中國銀行業(yè)實(shí)施巴塞爾新資本協(xié)議專家委員會委員、香港特別行政區(qū)政府經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展委員會委員等。

　　陳劍，南開大學(xué)金融學(xué)博士，現(xiàn)就職于中國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)督管理委員會。

　　Introduction to Part I
　　THE ESSENTIAL LESSONSBY ROGER LOWENSTEIN
　　If the modern reader were asked, what did the junk bonds of the 1980s, the dot-com stocks of the late 1990s, and, more recently, the various subprime mortgage portfolios of the 2000s all have in common, the first correct answer is that each of them took a nosedive from a highly inflated price to one rather closer to zero. You can throw in, for good measure, the net asset value and reputation of the world’s most intelligent hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). The second right answer is that each was an investment disaster whose perils could have been avoided by a patient reading of Security Analysis. Graham and Dodd wrote the first edition in 1934 and first revised it in 1940—some four decades before Michael Milken became a household name and three score years in advance of the frenzy for no-documentation, adjustable-rate mortgages. The authors advocated more than a merely generalized skepticism. They prescribed (as we will see) a series of specific injunctions, each of which would have served as a prophylactic against one or more of the above-named fiascos and their associated investment fads.
　　While the book was received by serious investors as an instant classic, I cannot say it elevated Wall Street or the public above their tendency to speculate. If I can venture a guess as to why, it is that even the experienced investor is too often like the teenage driver first taking over the wheel. He hears the advice about being careful, avoiding icy patches and so forth, and consigns it to the remote part of his brain reserved for archived parental instructions. He surely does not want to wreck the family car, but avoiding an accident is a low priority because he does not think it will happen to him. Thus with our investor: he is focused on making money, not with averting the myriad potential wrecks in the investment landscape. And I suspect that Graham and Dodd have been ignored by those who suffer from the misconception that trying to make serious money requires that one take serious risks. In fact, the converse is true. Avoiding serious loss is a precondition for sustaining a high compound rate of growth.
　　In 25 years as a financial journalist, virtually all of the investors of this writer’s acquaintance who have consistently earned superior profits have been Graham-and-Dodders. The most famous, of course, is Warren Buffett, and he is also the most illustrative. Buffett became Graham’s pupil and disciple in 1950, when as a scrawny 20-year-old, he confided to a friend that he would be studying under a pair of “hotshots” (meaning Benjamin Graham and his assistant David Dodd) at the Columbia Business School. 1 And he was also, years later, the first to admit that he had moved beyond the stocks that lay within his master’s ken. Buffett was an adapter; he did not imitate his mentor stroke for stroke. He began with Ben Graham types of stocks such as Berkshire Hathaway, which was then a struggling textile maker, and he moved on to Walt Disney and American Express, which possessed less in the way of tangible assets but more in economic value. Yet his approach remained consistent (even if the choice of securities it yielded did not).
　　It is this approach, successfully applied by a devoted minority of other professional and individual investors, that makes Security Analysis an enduring roadmap. It is still the bible for avoiding those icy patches—perhaps that much seems obvious—but it is also an instruction manual for identifying investments that are superior as well as safe.
　　This was known without a doubt to the working investors who enrolled in Graham’s classes, some of whom would bolt from the lecture hall to call their brokers with the names of the stocks that Professor Graham had used as examples. One later successful broker maintained that Graham’s tips had been so valuable that the class actually paid for his degree. Whatever the literal truth, Graham was the rare academic who was both theoretician and working practitioner. Some brief knowledge of the man will elucidate his approach. 2 At a personal level, Graham was a caricature of the absent-minded professor, a devotee of the classics, a student of Latin and Greek, and a translator of Spanish poetry who could dress for work in mismatched shoes and who evidenced little interest in money. But intellectually, his curiosity was unrivaled. When he graduated from Columbia in 1914, he was offered positions in English, mathematics, and philosophy. Taking the advice of a college dean, he went to Wall Street, which he treated rather like another branch of academia—that is, as a discipline that was subject to logical and testable principles (albeit ones that had yet to be discovered). He gravitated to money management, in which he excelled, eventually combining it with writing and teaching. It took Graham 20 years—which is to say, a complete cycle from the bull market of the Roaring Twenties through the dark, nearly ruinous days of the early 1930s—to refine his investment philosophy into a discipline that was as rigorous as the Euclidean theorems he had studied in college.
　　導(dǎo)讀必不可少的教誨
　　羅杰·洛溫斯坦
　　美國頂級財(cái)經(jīng)記者，暢銷書《巴菲特傳》作者
　　如果問現(xiàn)在的讀者，20 世紀(jì) 80 年代的垃圾債券、20世紀(jì) 90 年代末的科網(wǎng)股和 21 世紀(jì)的各種次級按揭貸款組合有什么共同點(diǎn)？第一個正確的答案是，它們的價格都經(jīng)歷了從高位暴跌至接近零的過程。世界上最“睿智”的對沖基金，長期資本管理公司（Long-Term Capital Management， LTCM）的聲譽(yù)和資產(chǎn)凈值也經(jīng)歷了同樣過程的例子。第二個正確的答案是，這些投資災(zāi)難都可能通過耐心閱讀《證券分析》得以避免。格雷厄姆和多德于 1934 年合寫了本書的第一版，在 1940 年進(jìn)行了第一次修訂，這個時間比邁克爾·米爾肯（Michael Milken，被譽(yù)為“垃圾債券之王”）成為一個家喻戶曉的名字早了約四十年；比不需審查貸款申請人收入就為其提供的貸款（no-documentation mortgages），及浮動利率抵押貸款（adjustable rate mortgages）的熱潮早了六十多年。作者倡導(dǎo)的不只是一般意義上的懷疑論，他們提出的是一系列具體訓(xùn)誡，其中每條訓(xùn)誡都可以防止一個到多個上述投資災(zāi)難和相關(guān)狂潮的出現(xiàn)。
　　雖然這本書被嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)耐顿Y者奉為經(jīng)典，但我不認(rèn)為它能夠改變?nèi)A爾街機(jī)構(gòu)或公眾的投機(jī)傾向。我認(rèn)為即使是經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的投資者，也可能表現(xiàn)得像初次駕車的年輕人一樣。他聽到了如“小心駕駛”、“避開結(jié)冰路面”這樣的忠告，卻置若罔聞，權(quán)當(dāng)是父母的嘮叨。
　　他肯定不希望撞壞家里的車，但避免意外并不是他優(yōu)先考慮的事，因?yàn)樗徽J(rèn)為意外會發(fā)生在自己身上。與此相似，投資者常常只將注意力集中于賺錢，卻對投資環(huán)境中無數(shù)潛在的風(fēng)險置之不理。我懷疑那些誤認(rèn)為“高收益必定來自高風(fēng)險”的人一直將格雷厄姆和多德的話當(dāng)作耳邊風(fēng)。但事實(shí)上，避免嚴(yán)重的損失，是維持高復(fù)利增長的一個先決條件。
　　在我 25 年的財(cái)經(jīng)記者生涯中，我所知曉的能夠一直獲得豐厚利潤的投資者，幾乎都是格雷厄姆和多德的信徒。其中最有名的，當(dāng)屬沃倫·巴菲特，他也是最具說服力的實(shí)例。1950 年，巴菲特成為格雷厄姆的學(xué)生，那時他還是個年僅 20 歲，瘦弱的年輕人。他曾向朋友透露過，他在哥倫比亞商學(xué)院兩位“能人”（指的是本杰明·格雷厄姆及其助手戴維·多德）的指導(dǎo)下學(xué)習(xí) ① 。而幾年后，他也是第一個承認(rèn)涉足超出導(dǎo)師所熟知的股票領(lǐng)域的人。巴菲特是一個相機(jī)行事者，沒有依葫蘆畫瓢地模仿他的恩師。他從格雷厄姆青睞的股票類型開始，如伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司——一個當(dāng)時還苦苦掙扎在破產(chǎn)邊緣的紡織品制造商。隨后，他轉(zhuǎn)向沃爾特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）和美國運(yùn)通（American Express）等擁有較少的有形資產(chǎn)，但更具經(jīng)濟(jì)價值的公司。但他的投資理念始終堅(jiān)持不變（即使因之選擇的證券在變）。
　　后來，少數(shù)忠實(shí)的專業(yè)投資者和個人投資者堅(jiān)持用這種投資方法取得了成功，也讓《證券分析》成為投資者手中一張歷久彌新的路線圖。至今，本書仍可謂是投資者不可或缺的圣經(jīng)，它提醒著投資者避開那些顯而易見但十分危險的“結(jié)冰道路”。同時，它也是投資者不可多得的一部投資寶典，引領(lǐng)著投資者尋覓一些出眾而安全的投資項(xiàng)目。
　　那些一邊參加格雷厄姆所授課程，一邊工作的投資者對此深信不疑。他們中的一些人曾中途溜出講堂給經(jīng)紀(jì)人打電話，交易格雷厄姆教授在課堂上舉例子時提到的股票。一個后來取得成功的經(jīng)紀(jì)人堅(jiān)稱，格雷厄姆的提示非常有價值，聽他的課能賺足學(xué)費(fèi)，可謂“課超所值”。無論這些記載是否屬實(shí)，格雷厄姆確實(shí)是不可多得的集理論家和實(shí)踐家于一身的學(xué)者。為了能更好地了解他的投資方法，我們先簡要地介紹一下他的特點(diǎn)。在個人層面上，格雷厄姆是一個十分健忘的教授，他一心記掛著工作，以至于意識不到自己穿著不成對的鞋子。同時，他也是古典文學(xué)的忠實(shí)愛好者，拉丁文和希臘文的研究者，西班牙語詩歌的翻譯家。他對金錢沒什么興趣，但在學(xué)術(shù)上，他的好奇心無人能及。1914 年從哥倫比亞大學(xué)畢業(yè)時，他同時得到了英語、數(shù)學(xué)和哲學(xué)的任教機(jī)會。但他聽從了一名院長的建議，來到了華爾街。在這里工作時，他更像是面對學(xué)術(shù)界的一個分支，一門涉及邏輯學(xué)和久經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)的原則（盡管這些原則尚未被發(fā)現(xiàn)）的學(xué)科。他被資金管理深深吸引，并在該領(lǐng)域表現(xiàn)出色，最終將實(shí)踐的成果融合到了他的寫作和教學(xué)中。格雷厄姆花了二十多年的時間把他的投資理念凝練成一門如歐式定理般嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)膶W(xué)科。在這么長的時間里，市場經(jīng)歷了一個完整的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期——從 20 世紀(jì) 20 年代興旺的大牛市，到 20 世紀(jì) 30 年代初黑暗的、接近毀滅的蕭條。
　　……

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