本書運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、概率論、優(yōu)化理論、博弈理論等方法和技術(shù)構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)橫縱向需求信息共享的數(shù)學(xué)模型，通過(guò)研究系統(tǒng)結(jié)構(gòu)、信息結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等因素對(duì)橫向及縱向需求信息共享的驅(qū)動(dòng)作用、橫向與縱向需求信息共享的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系以及需求信息共享對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的價(jià)值等，探究供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中橫縱向需求信息共享的內(nèi)在驅(qū)動(dòng)機(jī)制，為我國(guó)企業(yè)更加合理地的制定信息共享策略提供決策依據(jù)，促進(jìn)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間建立緊密的協(xié)作關(guān)系，降低需求不確定性因素對(duì)各企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)運(yùn)行狀態(tài)的影響。We investigate information flow in two-tier supply chains, where retailers order from suppliers and sell in a market with uncertain demand. The retailers each have access to a demand signal and can exchange signals (horizontal information sharing). The suppliers can offer the retailers differential payments to gain access to their signals . We demonstrate that retailer competition is a necessary condition to sustain information flow, whereas supplier competition precludes vertical information acquisition. Facing horizontal competition, the retailers can have an incentive to exchange signals if competition is less intense; and this incentive is stronger when they order from independent suppliers than when they order from a monopolist supplier