自“一帶一路”倡議提出后,中巴經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊建設(shè)快速推進(jìn),并已初見(jiàn)成效。與此同時(shí),在中國(guó)的參與和支持下,埃塞俄比亞—吉布提經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊、烏干達(dá)—肯尼亞經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊和盧旺達(dá)—坦桑尼亞經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊也開(kāi)始逐漸成型。
《國(guó)家智庫(kù)報(bào)告:“一帶一路”視野下亞非經(jīng)濟(jì)圈的構(gòu)建與發(fā)展(英文版)》系統(tǒng)分析了上述四大經(jīng)濟(jì)走廊的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展情況以及中國(guó)在其中所面臨的機(jī)遇與挑戰(zhàn)。
Introduction
One
Two
Three
Chapter I Regional Powers and Hot Issues in the Greater Central Asia Economic Circle
I.Russia's Influence in the Region Is Too Big to Be Underestimated
i.Russia's strategic goals in Central Asia
ii.The means Russia takes to realize its goals
II.Iran Sees Central Asia As One of Its Priority Areas for International Relations
i.Iran's westward strategy in Gulf countries
ii.Iran's development trend in Central Asia :
III.The Security Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan Is Complicated and Will Remain So for a Long Time
i.The security dilemma in Afghanistan
ii.The security situation in Pakistan doesn't look optimistic
IV.China's Strategic Goals, Challenges and Suggestions
i.China's main strategic goals
ii.Main challenges to China
iii.Policy recommendations
Chapter II Constructing the Indian Ocean Economic Circle with the Four Economic Corridors as Pillars
I.The Overview of the Development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Challenges to it
i.The overview and the role of the Gwadar port
ii.Transport and energy infrastructure construction for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor .
iii.Challenges to the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
II.China Helps Shape the Three Economic Corridors in Coastal East Africa
i.The Ethiopia-Djibouti Economic Corridor
ii.The Uganda-Kenya Economic Corridor
iii.The Rwanda-Tanzania Economic Corridor
III.Summary and Suggestions
Chapter III Promoting the Integration of the Bay of Bengal Economic Circle
I.The Current Development Situation in and Main Challenges To the Bay of Bengal Region
i.Economic development is uneven in the region
ii.Foreign trade is difficult to coordinate
iii.Transport and electricity infrastructure is poor
iv.Non-traditional security threats are growing
v.The awareness of regional integration is to be raised
II.India's Influence in the Bay of Bengal Region Should Be Valued
i.India has formed comparatively close partnership with Maldives
ii.India has developed and sustained relatively huge influence in Sri Lanka
iii.India sees Bangladesh as an important part of its geopolitical security
iv.India has seized the opportunity to advance all-round cooperation with Myanmar
v.India sees Indonesia as a key pivot point for its eastward policy
III.Difficulties Facing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
i.The region is too fragmented for economic integration
ii.India is cautious and concerned about China's development in South Asia
iii.Political changes in some countries have put major projects into trouble
iv.The supporting mechanism and coverage are insufficient
IV.Summary and Suggestions
Chapter IV Conclusions and Suggestions
i.Great regional powers that we have to deal with in order to extend the Belt and Road Initiative westward
ii.Geopolitical issues hindering the westward expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative
iii.Suggestions on development
References
《國(guó)家智庫(kù)報(bào)告:“一帶一路”視野下亞非經(jīng)濟(jì)圈的構(gòu)建與發(fā)展(英文版)》:
Secondly, Iran has been active in developing diplomatic relations with Qatar, Oman and Kuwait. Qatar is friendlier to Iran among Gulf countries and has always been suggesting dialogues with Iran in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). After the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran intensified diplomatic efforts with Qatar. In March 2015, Iran's parliament speaker Ali Larijani visited Qatar and held a meeting with the emir and the parliament speaker of Qatar, expressing the interest in bilateral cooperation. On the occasion of Lesser Bairam in July of that year, Iran's president Hassan Rouhani expressed his intent on a phone call with Qatar's emir to improve neighbor relations, launch political consultation, promote regional stability and fight terrorism, which received warm response from the latter. Later, Qatar made a lot of efforts to bring Iran and Gulf countries into dialogues on various occasions organized by the United Nations and the GCC. As to their economic and trade relations, Qatar is a major export destination for Iran which exports a lot of agricultural products, handicraft and livestock products to Qatar. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Iran and Qatar differ greatly over the Syria issue and it'll be difficult to significantly improve their relations in a short time.
Iran has been on good terms with Oman. Among the GCC members, Oman is the only one which didn't get involved in the Yemen war. In 2014, Oman hosted the six-party talks for the Iran nuclear issue and played a very positive role. In 2015, Iran and Oman maintained ministerial dialogues and re-defined their maritime border, paving the way for the development of their bilateral relations. At the GCC foreign ministers' meeting held in August 2015, Oman welcomed Qatar's suggestion about holding dialogues with Iran. Iran's president Rouhani valued the relations with Kuwait and struck a series of cooperation deals with the emir of Kuwait to launch investment, financial and tourism cooperation. In 2015, Iran's economic minister and foreign minister visited Kuwait, held a meeting with Kuwait's emir and reached consensus with the latter on regional peace and security as well as economic and trade cooperation. But in August 2015, Kuwait destroyed an arms sales group and claimed that it's associated with Iran and Hezbollah, casting shadow over the bilateral relations. It should be noted that Kuwait's current diplomatic choice is to balance the relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Thirdly, Iran's conflicts with Saudi Arabia and others won't be eased in the short term. Since the Islamic Revolution, Saudi Arabia has viewed Iran as a rival in the Middle East and the United States and Russia have stepped into the Iran-Saudi Arabic confiict. Since 2015, the stampede in Mina valley of Mecca and the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia have worsened the relations between the two. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia declared to sever relations with Iran. What really brought their relations to an end was the war in Yemen and Syria. In Yemen, the Houthis armed group supported by Iran and the allied army led by Saudi Arabia clashed fiercely in March 2015. Following that, the bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia deteriorated rapidly. In Syria, Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah sent armies to fight with the Bashar al-Assad regime while Saudi Arabia was with the Syrian rebels. After the Aleppo battle, the Bashar al-Assad regime had the upper hand and the extremist group was severely damaged. It'II be highly unlikely to see any improvement in the Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship in the short term. It should also be noted that the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not limited to the Middle East; the tension could be felt, to a varying degree, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will inevitably affect Iran's next move in Central Asia.
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